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Book Review
Hon. Henry J. Friendly: FederalJurisdiction:A General View. New York,
Columbia University Press, 1973. 199 pp. $10.00.
For the past decade or more the federal judiciary has been subjected
to particularly intense scrutiny and reevaluation as an institution, from within
and without, in an effort to define its proper role in relation to the other
branches of the federal government and to the judicial systems of the several
states. A comprehensive proposal for revision of the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, promulgated by the American Law Institute,' is now before the
Congress in the form of a bill introduced by Senator Burdick of North
Dakota.? A special commission of highly respected lawyers and academics
has proposed a National Court of Appeals to act as a screening device for
the U.S. Supreme Court, to relieve the latter's burgeoning caseload.3 Another
panel of legislators, judges, lawyers and teachers is at work on a geographical
reorganization of the 11 Circuit Courts of Appeals The recent periodical
literature has produced a rash of extra-judicial statements by lower court
judges on the state of the judiciary,5 complementing (though not inevitably
1. ALI SrDy OF THE DrVIsIoN OF JuiSDICTioN BETvWEEN STATE AND
FEDDERAL CoutRTs (1969). See Currie, The FederalCourts and The American Law
Institute, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 1, 268 (1968-69); Wright, Restructuring Federal

Jurisdiction: The American Law Institute Proposals, 26 W.ASH. & LEE L. REv.
185 (1969).
2. S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
3. FEDAL. Juncra CENTER, ItEPORT OF THE STuDy GRoup o THE CAsE-

LOAD OF TH SuPnmRM CoURT, REPORT 9, (1972), 57 F.R.D. 573 (1973). See,
from a mass of literature on these proposals: BICKEL, THE CASELOAD OF TE
SUPREmE Cotmr, AND WHAT, iF ANYTHING, To Do ABoUT IT (American Enter-

prise Institute for Public Policy Research, Domestic Affairs Study 21, Nov. 1973);
Brennan, Justice Brennan Calls National Court of Appeals Proposal "Fundamentally Unnecessaryand Ill-Advised", 59 A.B.A.J. 835 (1973); Burger &Warren,
Retired Chief Justice Warren Attacks, Chief Justice Burger Defends Freund Study
Group's Composition and Proposal, 59 A.B.A.J. 721 (1973); Gressman, The
Constitutionvs. The Freund Report, 41 GEo. WAH. L. REv. 951 (1973); Stokes,
National Court of Appeals: An Alternative Proposal, 60 A.B.A.J. 179 (1974);
Note, The National Court of Appeals: A Constitutional'inferior Court?, 72 MICH.
L. IEv. 290 (1973).
4. See CominssioN ON REV ox OF ma FEDE AL Couav APPELLATE SysTEM, PELnnxNARY REPORT: THE GEOGRAPHmCAL BouNDAxrs OF THE SEvERAL

JUDICIAL Cmcurrs: ALTERNATVE PROPOSALS (1973).

5. See, e.g., Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction:A Federal
Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 L. &
S.O. 557 (1973); Coffin, Justice and Workability: Un Essai, 5 SUFFoIX L. REV.
567 (1971); Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 COmRNLL
L. REv. 634 (1974); Haynsworth, Improving the Handling of Criminal Cases in
the Federal Appellate System, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 597 (1974); Haynsworth,
A New Court to Improve the Administration of justice, 59 A.B.A.J. 841 (1973);
Hufstedler, Courtship and Other Legal Arts, 60 A.B.A.J. 545 (1974); Hufstedler,
Comity and the Constitution: The Changing Role of the Federal Judiciary, 47
N.Y.U. L. REv. 841 (1972); Hufstedler, New Blocks for Old Pyramids: Reshaping
the JudicialSystem, 44 So. CAL. L. REv. 901 (1971); Lay, Modern Administrative
(481)
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [1974], Art. 9
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

complimenting) those of the Chief Justice.0 In this volume one of our most
respected federal judges, a student of the subject since long before his
elevation to the bench, 7 brings together his views on these problems in
forceful, readable style.
Those who might be misled by the somewhat innocent sound of the
title should be forewarned: this is not a reference work on the Law of
Federal Jurisdiction for scholars or practitioners, nor yet a primer on the
subject for the neophyte. The lack of an index would disqualify the book
for these jobs in any case. The consignment of these James S. Carpentier
Lectures to the printer less than one month after their delivery at Columbia
University betrays a more urgent purpose, which is to influence the immediate course of reform. Nonetheless, while Judge Friendly's intended audience is doubtless the expert and decision-maker, he manages to make the
nature of the problems and the main lines of his argument readily accessible
to the non-expert. Since the work of the federal courts now helps shape
the professional life of virtually every lawyer, as well as the public and
private life of every citizen, no lawyer can afford to be unaware of the
problems to which Judge Friendly addresses himself. This book is as good
as any now available for heightening that awareness.
Judge Friendly's premise is succinctly stated: "[Tihe inferior federal
courts, and indeed the Supreme Court as well, are faced with the prospect
of a breakdown." s District court actions filed in the fiscal year 1972 were
40% higher than in 1968, whereas they had increased only 17%in the seven
years between 1961 and 1968. 9 This "explosion of federal litigation," he
points out, results not merely from population increases, but principally
from expansion of judicial responsibility in several specific areas, most
notably civil rights actions and petitions for post-conviction review by state
and federal prisoners. 10 The growth of complex administrative responsibilities in the adjudication of cases under the revised class-action rule, among
others, makes the rise in mere numbers of filings itself an inadequate index
of the increased burden. Responsibility for these expansions is placed on the
one hand with the Supreme Court's liberal decisions and on the other with
Congressional fondness for remedies without machinery and for federalization of interstate crime.

Proposals for Federal Habeas Corpus: The Rights of Prisoners Preserved, 21
DEPAuL L. REV. 701 (1972); Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and
Quality of State Law, 13 WAY-E L. REv. 317 (1967); Haynsworth, Book Review,
87 HAv. L. REV. 1082 (1974).
6. See Burger, Report on the Federal Judicial Branch-1973, 59 A.B.A.J.
1125 1973); Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-1972,58 A.B.A.J. 1049

7. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction,41 HAMv. L. REV.
488 (1928).
8. H. FDJENDLY, FEDERAL JUIusDIcTION: A GENERAL ViEw 3 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as F=.ENDLY].
9. There is some evidence in the most recent statistics that the flood may
be slackening somewhat. Although civil filings are still increasing, a reduction of
criminal filings has brought about an overall reduction in the number of cases
filed in the first 6 months of fiscal 1974. See 60 A.B.A.J. 566 (1974).
10. Fnm.NDLY, at 19, 27.
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This breakdown cannot be avoided merely by adding more judges,
since that would tend to dilute the high quality and prestige which are,
in Judge Friendly's view, "the very values the federal court system is meant
to attain."" The most promising solution, rather, is to contain the caseload
of the federal courts within manageable limits, which in turn requires a
substantial curtailment of some jurisdictional categories to allow for normal
expansion in others. The foundation of such a reform must be an understanding of what the federal courts can do which other agencies-either
state courts or administrative bodies-can't do just as well. To establish the
perimeters of his discussion, Judge Friendly posits two models of federal
jurisdiction-the "minimum" and the "maximum" model-and, on the assumption that "no one in his senses would advocate either,"' 2 argues for a number
of compromises essentially along pragmatic lines.
The "minimum model" consists of those categories of cases in which
"everything is to be gained and nothing is to be lost" by placing jurisdiction
in lower federal courts. Judge Friendly lists five such categories: actions by
the United States, either criminal (exclusive) or civil (concurrent with the
states); actions against the United States or against its officers or agencies
under federal law (exclusive); admiralty and maritime cases; bankruptcy
cases (exclusive); and patent and copyright cases (exclusive). He considers
that the lower courts would have plenty to do even under this minimum
model, which would eliminate both general diversity and general federal
question jurisdiction.
The "maximum model" would extend the current -scope by eliminating
the "complete diversity" requirement, eliminating most of the current restrictions on removal, eliminating the jurisdictional amount requirement in
federal question cases and reducing it in diversity cases, and making all
federal question jurisdiction exclusive. The principal argument in favor of
this approach would be that the federal courts provide a "juster justice."13
While Judge Friendly does not advocate restriction of the federal courts
to the minimum model, he does urge some restraint even in those cases.
In the criminal area, the principal problem has been Congress' urge to make
everything a federal crime; the courts can do little to mitigate the burden
thus imposed on them, and the author can only support a proposal to give
federal law enforcement authorities discretionary power to withhold enforcement efforts where nonfederal agencies can act effectively and there is no
substantial federal interest in further prosecution. 14 With respect to actions
by the United States to enforce federal regulatory statutes, Judge Friendly
believes that the recent tendency in such legislation to bypass administrative
agencies and to place the initial fact-finding burden on the courts should be
reversed. Too frequently the courts are no better qualified to make such
factual investigations than are expert administrative agencies.';

11. FRIENDLY at 81.
12. FRIENDLY at 13.
13. FRIENDLY at 12, quoting from Hart, The Relations Between State and

Federal Law, 54 COLT-M. L. REv. 489, 518 (1954).
14.
15.

FRmINDLY
FREmNDLY

at 60-61.
at 62-68.
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In two areas encompassed within the "minimum model", Judge Friendly
proposes substantially increased roles for specialized courts. For patent cases,
current law permits action in the regular district courts as an alternative to
appeal before the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals regarding denial of
applications and rulings on priority; in addition, exclusive jurisdiction is
placed in the regular federal courts over claims for infringement and for
declarations of invalidity. Instead, a Patent Court is proposed for all cases
arising under the patent laws, subject only to discretionary Supreme Court
review, with cases in other courts into which a patent question enters other
than by the original complaint subject to removal to the Patent Court.16 In
tax cases current law gives the taxpayer three alternative fora for initial
judicial review of administrative decision: the Tax Court, the Court of
Claims, and the regular district courts, each with a different avenue of appellate review. Here judge Friendly first espouses Dean Erwin Griswold's
30-year-old proposal for a Court of Tax Appeals, to which all appeals from
trial court determinations in tax cases would be directedY.' The author then
advocates consolidation of all original jurisdiction in tax cases in the Tax
Court reorganized on a regional basis.' 8 In both of these areas, in his
opinion, the need for expertise and for uniformity of decision overrides any
objection to judicial specialization.
Outside the "minimum model, Judge Friendly proposes to eliminate
from the regular federal court dockets three types of cases, two now coming
under the heading of federal question jurisdiction and one under the heading of diversity of citizenship. The first two-work-related injury claims of
railroad workers and of seamen-would be handled administratively in the
manner of other workmen's compensation cases, subject presumably to
judicial review of administrative action. The third, motor vehicle accident
cases, would be expressly excepted from diversity jurisdiction, thereby
leaving them to the state courts; Judge Friendly hopes, however, that the
states themselves will come to some non-judicial solution such as the various
no-fault or first-party insurance plans. 9
Beyond these relatively manageable constrictions based upon subject
matter categories lie more byzantine complexities of jurisdictional doctrine,
toward the unraveling of which Judge Friendly shows an ambivalence that
will disappoint many reformers. Prominent among the deadends and detours
thrown up by two centuries of doctrinal and legislative tinkering are: the
complete diversity rule; 20 the jurisdictional amount;21 removal based on a
separate and independent cause of action;22 the abstention doctrines;2 the
16. FRIENDLY at 153.
17. Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HA~v. L. REV. 1153
(1944).
18. FnRENDLY at 168.
19. FrIENDLY at 133-37.

20. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267 (1806), a maddeningly cryptic
opinion which has been understood to be statutory interpretation, rather than
constitutional principle. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S.
523 (1967).
21. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1970).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1970).
23. See C. Wmorrr,LAw or FED R.AL CouNTs § 52 (2d ed. 1970).
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so-called well-pleaded complaint rule;24 the limitation of removal to defendants, and of removability to the well-pleaded complaint or petition; 2 the
exhaustion of remedies requirements. 26 The principal concern evidenced by
these devices has been the allocation of judicial business between the state
and federal court systems, in cases in which the two have essentially concurrent jurisdiction. Judge Friendly singles out for discussion in this regard
two broad categories of cases now burdening the federal courts: claims for
relief from civil rights violations under the general civil rights statute,
42 U.S.C. §1983, and diversity of citizenship cases.
Section 1983, liberally interpreted by the Supreme Court,2 7 has become
a vehicle for immediate review in the lower federal courts of the constitutionality of a bewildering variety of state legislation and administrative
acts, far beyond the issues of personal liberty which were surely the intended
targets of the Civil Bights Act of 1871. Judge Friendly's professed unhappiness with this trend stems not from the extended protection thus afforded
civil rights, but from the undue displacement of the state courts from their
essential responsibility for enforcement of the constitution. He discusses
three principles of accommodation to the role of state courts in protecting
civil rights-abstention, comity (the so-called anti-injunction statute) 28 and
the exhaustion requirement-and counsels greater restraint by the federal
courts, without being able to find a satisfactory formula for limiting their
power to act. He believes that the abstention doctrines should remain
uncodified, 29 and that while exhaustion of state administrative remedies
should be stringently required, a general requirement that state judicial
avenues be first pursued would be inappropriate 30 On the other hand, he
does consider that the Supreme Court was mistaken in determining that the
Civil Rights Act constitutes an exception to the anti-injunction act;31 he
considers it more appropriate to amend the latter provision to allow injunctions in the rare cases in which they are truly necessary to prevent irrepara32
ble harm.
For federal question cases in general, he would abolish the jurisdictional amount, if for no other reason than that it is now so riddled with
express exceptions as to have only capricious application 3 3 He would also
allow removal from state court based on the assertion of a federal-question
defense; but, again because he believes that the federal constitution is not

24. E.g., Louisville &N. RR. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).

25. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S.
100 (1941); C. WniGn, L W OF FEDERAL COURTS § 37 (2d ed. 1970).
26. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908); Bacon v.
Rutland R.R., 232 U.S. 134 (1914); C. WwGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL CoUrTs § 49
(2d ed. 1970).
27. E.g., Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972); Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
29. FRmENDLY at 94.
30. FRmNDLY at 101.
31. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225.
32. FlImNDLY at 99-100.
33. FRIENDLY at 120-24.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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the exclusive province of the federal courts, 34
he would allow removal only
if the defense were based on a federal statute.
When it comes to diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction, Judge Friendly's
negative views have not changed in 45 years.35 He regards the entire category as a "prime candidate" for elimination from the federal courts,3 6 and,
if he had his druthers, would see only two fragments retained: alienage
diversity and interpleader, both subcategories having special federal interest.37 As already noted, he believes that the federal courts do or should
provide a "juster justice"; he rejects the conclusion, however, that the federal
courts should therefore be opened to more state cases. First and foremost,
the quality of federal judging depends in large part on the maintenance
of a manageable caseload; second, in diversity cases, the Erie doctrine
(which Judge Friendly considers correctly decided) 38 deprives the federal
courts of one of their principal tools, the power to declare the law; and
third, diversity cases are the "dullest" of the civil category and thus do not
contribute to the federal judges' professional development. 39 On the other
hand, returning diversity cases to the state 40courts would not hurt them,
because their caseload is too far gone as it is.

The wholesale elimination of diversity jurisdiction, however, is not in
the cards, as the American Law Institute recognized and Judge Friendly
fears. That being so, Judge Friendly would base all partial reforms not on
logic or ease of application, but on the principle of maximum discouragement of diversity cases. In particular, he embraces the complete diversity
rule and rejects even the modest refinements proposed by the A.L.I., because the effect of such reform would be to increase the federal caseload. 41
Here, indeed, the Judge's frustration surely clouds his judgment. As a last
resort, he "sees no reason why" the trial judges cannot assign all other cases
priority for trial over diversity cases.42 We may hope, however, that the
courts will decline this last invitation to a sit-down strike; one could as easily
justify refusing to read briefs, hear closing argument, or spend more than
15 minutes per trial in any case which the judges deem "dull".
Finally, we may note Judge Friendly's opposition to the so-called Freund
Report's controversial recommendation for the establishment of a "National
Court of Appeals" to help control the Supreme Court's caseload. Under that
proposal, the National Court would be composed of seven circuit judges,
serving on a rotating basis. It would receive all applications for appellate
review to the Supreme Court, and would dispose of all but perhaps 10% of
them either by denying review or by undertaking such review itself. Judge
Friendly's objections may be summarized as follows: it is not obvious that
34. FmENDLY at 125-26.
35. See note 7 supra.
36. FRmNDLY at 142.
37. FrIENDLY at 149.
38. See Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New FederalCommon Law,
39 N.Y.U. L. RBv. 83 (1964).
39. FmrNDLY at 144.
40. FRiENDLY at 149.
41. F.RmNDLY at 152.
42. Id.
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a rotating panel of circuit judges would do any better job than the Supreme
Court does now; the composition of the National Court precludes expertise
and ensures "average' manpower; the National Court would lack the prestige and respect which enables circuit judges now to accept Supreme Court
review of their product; the introduction of a fourth judicial level would
increase the delay in deciding those cases which are deemed worthy of
Supreme Court review; and the proposal would rob the Supreme Court of
control over its own docket. The cure for the problem, in his view, lies in
more efficient procedures within the Court itself (more division of labor on
petitions for certiorari, for example), and in control of the flow of litigation
43
into the system at the lower levels.
There can be no doubt that this book is among the most important
statements in the current debate over the proper role of the federal juidiciary.
It combines uniquely the conciseness and pragmatism of the working judge
with the thoroughness and documentation of the scholar. If it fails to achieve
a wholly rational and consistent approach to the subject, we are entitled to
doubt that such a goal can be achieved, short of eliminating the dual court
hierarchies which other more recently constructed federal systems (such as
Canada, Australia and West Germany) have wisely avoided. Short of that,
we need to escape from regional, inter-governmental and interdepartmental
jealousies and focus on what the federal courts as such can effectively do.
It is Judge Friendly's service to urge that focus upon us.
WmULAm B. Fiscn*

48. Fm rDLY at 49-54. See also Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening
the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 684 (1974).

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia; A.B. Harvard
College, 1957; LL.B. University of Illinois, 1960; M. Comp. L. University of
Chicago, 1962; Dr. Jur. University of Freiburg, 1972.
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